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Micro-data estimates of welfare indices are known to be sensitive to observations from
the tails of the income distribution. It is therefore customary to make adjustments to
extreme data before estimating inequality and poverty statistics. This paper systemati-
callyevaluates theimpactofsuch adjustmentsonindicators estimatedfromthe EU-SILC
(Community Statistics on Income and Living conditions) which is expected to become
the reference source for comparative statistics on income distribution and social exclu-
sion in the EU. Emphasis is put on the robustness of cross-country comparisons to alter-
native adjustments. Results from a sensitivity analysis considering both simple, classical
adjustments and a more sophisticated approach based on modelling parametrically the
tails of the income distribution are reported. Reassuringly, ordinal comparisons of coun-
tries are found to be robust to variants of data adjustment procedures. However, data
adjustments are far from innocuous. Cardinal comparisons of countries reveal sensitive
to the treatment of extreme incomes, even for seemingly small adjustments.
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Regulation (EC) No. 1177/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council the European
Union of 16 June 2003 has given legal existence to EU-SILC, the Community Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions, a new instrument aiming at collecting comparable micro-data
about the income and living conditions in the European Union. EU-SILC has been created
as one of the key data sources for estimating the statistical indicators for monitoring and re-
porting on social inclusion that were endorsed at the Laeken European Council in December
2001. By providing a common data source with comparable individual- and household-level
micro-data on income and living conditions, EU-SILC is meant to foster distributional com-
parisons both over time and across European countries. EU-SILC is therefore expected to
become a key instrument for benchmarking national performance with regard to redistribu-
tive and social policies, since it will allow the computation of poverty and inequality statistics
consistently estimated across countries and over time throughout the European Union.
Given this anticipated usage, estimation of welfare indices from EU-SILC ought to be as
accurate and consistent as possible. Accuracy of estimates of poverty and inequality involves
a bewildering array of issues. It ranges from the mere deﬁnition of the underlying concept
of “economic well-being” that one is trying to capture (typically, a person’s access to goods
and services), or the deﬁnition of the relevant income components, to the selection of ap-
propriate summary welfare indicators, via the deﬁnition of the basic unit of analysis and the
within-household income sharing assumptions. These issues are well appreciated – the report
of the International Expert Group on Household Income Statistics (Canberra Group, 2001)
provides a thorough discussion of many of these issues.1 Many of their recommendations
were incorporated in the European regulations which deﬁne the ofﬁcial guiding framework
for EU-SILC.2
It also is well-known, in particular since the work of Cowell & Victoria-Feser (1996a,
1996b, 2002), that welfare indicators estimated from micro-data can be very sensitive to the
presence of a few extreme incomes. This is particularly problematic for many indicators of
inequality which are not robust to the presence of data contamination at one or both ends of
the distribution. This formally means that a single datum, provided it is sufﬁciently large (or
small), can drive the estimated inequality indicator arbitrarily large (or small). By contrast,
poverty indicators are considered robust provided the poverty line is exogenously determined
(or is itself robustly estimated), but this generally holds under the assumption that income
data are positive, or at least are bounded from below (that is, can not be arbitrarily small).
Welfare indicators –inequality indicators in particular– are therefore potentially biased if the
data are contaminated by ‘mistakes’ taking the form of very high or very low incomes.
Erroneous extreme observations can arise for various reasons. They can be gross mis-
takes, such as miscoding of a decimal separator or they can be due to severe reporting error
by survey respondents. Mistaken extreme values can also arise even if income data are cor-
1See also Atkinson et al. (2002) or van der Laan (2006) and Verma (2006) for a focus on EU-SILC.
2See, in particular, the Council and European Parliament regulation 1177/2003 and the Commission Regu-
lation 1983/2003.
1rectly collected because the measured annual income is not an error-free signal of a person’s
economic well-being. Think of extremely low (especially negative) incomes. Non-positive
economic well-being (viewed as the access to goods and services) is an implausible situation
as it would imply starvation. However, there are several reasons for observing very low, even
negative, incomes in micro-data.3 Such observations may not be plainly tagged as “mistakes”
in the sense of error of data collection but they are clear expressions of a mis-measurement
of economic well-being that lead to extreme measured incomes.
Another implication of the sensitivity of welfare indicators to extreme incomes is that,
even if there is no contamination in the data –extreme incomes are real, accurate measure-
ments of people’s well-being–, the sampling variability of welfare indicators can be large be-
cause of the sparseness of very high/very low incomes in the underlying population, thereby
limiting the reliability of inferences made to the overall population of a country. The close
link between robustness to contamination and sampling variability is formally clear from
the inﬂuence function of the estimators which serves both as a tool for assessing the robust-
ness properties of a statistic (see Hampel et al., 1986) and as a component of their sampling
variance in some linearization methods (see Deville, 1999).4 In addition, notwithstanding
the large sampling error problem, one may question whether it is acceptable that a few data
points –a few responding households– have a large leverage on estimated national indicators.
In recognition of these issues, it is customary to inspect the data and make some simple
adjustments to extreme incomes prior to estimating indicators, such as eliminating or recod-
ing a fraction of the data.5 The objective is to keep the inﬂuence of extreme incomes under
control, thereby limiting the risk of making large (potentially unbounded) estimation errors
and reducing the sampling variability of the estimates.6 However, while data adjustments
have potential beneﬁts and are often deemed necessary, in the vast majority of cases, their
application is of an ad hoc nature and one rarely estimates the magnitude of their impact on
the estimated indicators, or assesses the sensitivity of the resulting estimates to alternative
adjustments (recoding rather than deleting data, for instance). In the context of EU-SILC
which primarily involves cross-country comparisons, the problem is compounded because
differences in the prevalence of extreme observations across countries is likely to lead to dif-
ferent impacts for different data adjustments. There is therefore an issue about the inﬂuence
3First, some elements are counted as income deductions. Negative incomes can arise because of taxes that
have to be paid on incomes received in an earlier year (Eurostat, 2005). Losses can be observed with self-
employment income (Eurostat, 2006b). Inter-household mandatory payments (alimonies) may also be a source
of substantial income deductions. Second, several sources of income are not captured in standard deﬁnitions of
disposable income (e.g. capital gains or home-production). Furthermore, income is measured during a limited
time period but people can draw on past (and future) incomes to maintain their command over goods and
services. See Eurostat (2006c) for further discussion.
4See also Osier (2006).
5Eurostat (2006c), for example, discusses the particular problems posed by zero and negative incomes and
suggests a series of data adjustments; see supra.
6Some analysts have also tended to favour indicators thought to be more robust to the presence of extreme
incomes (e.g. percentile ratios) over indicators with more attractive theoretical properties (such as (generalized)
Gini, Generalized Entropy or Atkinson inequality indices).
2of such practice in cross-country comparisons.
This paper attempts to shed light on this matter by presenting the results a sensitivity anal-
ysisbasedonEU-SILC2004data, theﬁrstofﬁcialreleaseofEU-SILC(Eurostat,2006a). The
exercise is meant to provide a systematic and comprehensive empirical assessment of the sen-
sitivity of welfare indicators to extreme incomes and to assess the robustness of cross-country
comparisons to alternative data adjustments.7 Both simple, classical adjustments and a more
sophisticated approach based on modelling parametrically the tails of the income distribu-
tion are considered. Reassuringly, ordinal comparisons of countries appear to be generally
robust to data adjustment procedures. However, the magnitude of the impact of seemingly
small adjustments turns out to be such that cardinal comparisons of countries are surprizingly
sensitive to the treatment of extreme incomes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by describing
the data and identifying the magnitude and source of extreme incomes in the 2004 EU-SILC
data. Data adjustments for dealing with extreme incomes that are considered in the sensitivity
analysis are described in Section 3. Results of the analysis are reported in Section 4. Section
5 summarizes the main lessons and provides a ﬁnal discussion.
2 Extreme incomes in EU-SILC 2004
2.1 The EU-SILC 2004 data
The purpose of the EU-SILC is to ensure that EU countries possess the required statistical in-
frastructure to estimate reliable indicators reﬂecting the multi-dimensionality of poverty and
social exclusion. It is expected to become the reference source for comparative statistics on
income distribution and social exclusion in Europe. As indicated at the start of the paper, EU-
SILC has a formal legal basis which makes its implementation compulsory in EU member
states. The Council and European Parliament regulation 1177/2003 deﬁnes the scope of EU-
SILC, provides deﬁnitions, time reference, data characteristics, sampling rules, sample sizes,
etc. In addition, detailed technical aspects of implementation are deﬁned in a set of Commis-
sion Regulations. The micro-data available in EU-SILC are expected to be representative of
the population living in private households in each of the participating countries.
It is important to realize that EU-SILC is based on a common framework (that is, a com-
mon set of target variable deﬁnitions and rules), but it is not a common, European-wide
survey. Distinct surveys are held in different countries with potentially different designs and
implementation, within the framework provided by the regulations. Comparability is ensured
by the common framework and deﬁnition of target variables, but ﬂexibility is allowed in the
collection of the data. Target variables on income, for example, are collected from household
surveys in some countries while it is extracted from administrative sources in other countries.
The ﬁrst ofﬁcial release of EU-SILC (Eurostat, 2006a), which is now available from Eu-
rostat for research purposes and which is used in this paper, contains data collected in 2004
7See Cowell et al. (1999) for a similar exercise.
3in 14 countries, namely Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain
(Es), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU),
Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), and Sweden (SE). Data from 25 Member states plus Norway
and Iceland will be available from EU-SILC 2005 onwards (to be released in 2007).
The core of EU-SILC is collection of detailed data on income both at the household and
individual level. The nature and deﬁnitions of the income components that are collected
in EU-SILC are speciﬁed in detail in its legal framework. These speciﬁcations adhere as
closely as possible to the recommendations of the International Expert Group on Household
Income Statistics (Canberra Group, 2001). The income components measured are meant to
allowthe estimationoffourmain (household)aggregates: totaldisposable householdincome,
total disposable household income before transfers (with and without old-age and survivor
beneﬁts) and total gross income. Differences in implementation of EU-SILC and transitory
exceptionstotherecommendationsoftheCanberraGrouphaveleadtotwokeydistinctionsin
the EU-SILC 2004 income data. First, four countries have obtained income information from
administrative sources (DK, FI, NO, SE) while the other ten countries have used surveys.
Second, a number of countries have been temporarily allowed to deliver net incomes (or a
mix of gross and net incomes) at the components level (rather gross income as required in the
regulations).
Extensive documentation about the EU-SILC project and data is available in the afore-
mentioned Council and European Parliament regulation and the associated Commission reg-
ulations, as well as in working group reports available from Eurostat. Clémenceau et al.
(2006) also provide a detailed description of the EU-SILC project.
2.2 Income components and extreme incomes
Given the complexity of the household income aggregates as a combination of different com-
ponents, and potential cross-national differences in the prevalence and way of collection of
these incomes, it is useful to inspect the structure of the data in detail in order to identify the
potential sources of extreme incomes.
Figures 1.1 to 1.5 provide depictions of the income data contained in the EU-SILC 2004
dataset in each of the fourteen countries for which data are available. For the eight countries
presented in the ﬁrst three ﬁgures, it is the gross income components that are presented. For
the latter six countries, income components are normally reported net. All constituent in-
come components are described along with the constructed aggregate “total household gross
income” (where available) and “total disposable household income”. For each country, the
plots are composed of three distinct panels. The ﬁrst panel presents the income range within
which 98 percent of the observations are contained. (All incomes are expressed relative to
the mean disposable household income in the country.) The mean value of the income com-
ponent (among all non-zero values) is marked by a vertical bar. Ranges that span to the left of
the ﬁrst vertical dashed line indicate that it contains negative values. Ranges that span to the
right of the second vertical dashed line extend to higher incomes than household disposable
income (for example, obviously, total gross incomes span to higher values than disposable
incomes). The second panel gives the proportion of non-zero incomes. The proportion of
4negative values is highlighted in light grey. The third panel gives the proportion of observa-
tions that are above the upper end of the range of disposable income (marked by the second
vertical dashed line in the ﬁrst panel).
The main observations emerging from inspection of these ﬁgures are the following. Con-
sider ﬁrst the group of countries with incomes presented gross in EU-SILC 2004.
Employee (cash) income is the most important income component. It has a wide range
of variation and is received by a large fraction of households in all countries. Overall, cross-
country variations are not very large (compared to other components). Expectedly, self-
employment incomes signal themselves as potentially problematic in further analysis. First,
they can turn negative in several countries (BE, DK, EE, LU, NO), and sometimes substan-
tially so (see DK and NO). Second, it is generally the income component with the widest
range of variation (see IE where the inner 98 percent of observations span from 0 to up
to 8 times mean disposable income). Very high self-employment incomes are observed in
all countries. Furthermore, in both aspects, substantial differences emerge across countries.
Important cross-country differences also emerge in the proportion of households reporting
receipt of self-employment incomes (from 9 percent in BE up to 40 percent in DK). Besides
actual differences, several artefacts can be the cause of these discrepancies: differences in
the mode of collection of the self-employment data which are allowed within the EU-SILC
framework (e.g. drawings out of business, operating proﬁts/losses or ofﬁcial tax declara-
tion; deduction or not of losses), differences in patterns of under-reporting and non-response
(which is substantial for self-employment income), differences in imputation rules. (See the
discussion in Eurostat (2006b) and Eurostat (2006c).)
Old-agebeneﬁtsarethebeneﬁtswiththelargestrange, andsomeobservationsarerecorded
as “very high” in several countries. However, globally, beneﬁts are unlikely to be problematic
with regard to distribution tails. Most have a narrow range of variations. Cross-country dif-
ferences also exist, but are less striking than differences in self-employment income. Rents
from property or land also appear relatively innocuous, with very large observations found
only in FI, IE and LU. Interests and dividends may be more problematic. First, the proportion
of households recorded as receiving interests and dividends vary widely from 5 percent in EE
up to 99 percent in NO. Second, the range of variation is generally small but there are striking
exceptions in NO and FI. This leads to the presence of a number of outlying incomes in these
two countries (as well as in BE and DK). The situation of DK is also peculiar with 58 percent
of households receiving negative interests and dividends (however the range of variation is
small). Inter-household transfers and taxes on wealth are unlikely to play any signiﬁcant role
with regard to income distribution tails and the generation of outlying observations. Finally,
the overall picture of income taxes and social security contributions is remarkably similar
across countries.
These observations are not much affected when considering the six countries reporting
income components in net amounts (or partially net and partially gross amounts). Self-
employment incomes still appear potentially problematic. They contribute many outlying
observations in disposable income in the upper tail (along with employee income), and may
contain substantial negative values. Rent from property or land now appear potentially large
5as well. Note ﬁnally the very compressed income ranges observed in Sweden (overall and in
most income components).8
2.3 The prevalence of extreme incomes in key income aggregates
The prevalence of very high or very low incomes in the aggregate income variables of interest
here, namely household disposable income and single-adult-equivalent household income is
presented in Figure 2.9 The bars to the left indicate the proportion of households which record
an income below 10 percent of the mean. Negative incomes among those are highlighted in
light grey. The bars to the right present the proportion of households recording incomes
above 4 times the mean. Different colouring indicates the proportion of households with
income between 4-8 times the mean and 8 times the mean and above.
All countries (except AT and PT) have households with negative incomes (with most
prevalence in GR and EE). Their number is well below one percent of the observations. In
many countries, the fraction of observations with incomes below 10 percent of the mean
reaches one percent. Countries with the largest fractions of very low incomes also tend to
have the highest fractions of very high incomes (EE and PT). Almost one percent of the ob-
servations in most countries are recorded above four times the average income in the country.
The picture is hardly affected if equivalent income is used rather than total disposable in-
come. Extreme observations are present in all of the countries datasets, and there is therefore
interest in assessing how much comparisons of distributional indicators are affected by their
presence.
3 Dealing with extreme incomes in inequality and poverty
measurement
As explained in the Introduction, welfare measures are potentially sensitive to the presence
of extreme incomes, large or small. Additionally, some measures are not even identiﬁed if
there are non-positive incomes in the data. Adjustments to the data are therefore routinely
applied before estimating inequality and poverty measures. Given the important role given to
EU-SILC for monitoring progress in the EU with respect to poverty and inequality, it appears
important to engage in a thorough sensitivity analysis in order to better understand the impact
of such adjustments and re-assure ourselves that conclusions are not dramatically affected.
For this purpose, a series of inequality and poverty indicators have been estimated using EU-
SILC 2004, after applying a number of different, relatively standard, data adjustments meant
to deal with extreme incomes. Six different types of adjustments, have been experimented
8A noticeable feature is the range of taxes on wealth in France. They, however, only concern a very small
fraction of households.
9Welfare indicators are typically estimated from the single-adult equivalent household income which takes
into account the size and age composition of households. Disposable income is divided by a scale which
converts all incomes into a common standard equivalent to a single-adult household. See supra.
6with. They are described in turn in this Section.
3.1 Trimming and Winsorizing
The ﬁrst two types of data adjustment are common, naive methods: trimming and winsorizing
a ﬁxed percentage of the data at either or both ends of the income distribution.
Trimming the data is a simple strategy to prevent extreme incomes to inﬂuence estimated
statistics. It consists in removing from the dataset a given number or a given percentage of
the highest and/or lowest incomes (see, e.g., Bernstein & Mishel, 1997, Acemoglu, 2003).
This implicitly considers that extreme observations contain no valid information about the
economic well-being of the recipients and should not have any inﬂuence in the resulting
estimates. Trimming as a tool for making ‘robust’ welfare comparisons in distributional
analysis is thoroughly discussed in Cowell & Victoria-Feser (2006), while Hampel et al.
(1986) discusses such an approach in contrast to more sophisticated procedures.10
Trimming thresholds above and beyond which observations are discarded are typically
determined by quantiles Q(1 − 0.01p) and Q(0.01p) of the unadjusted dataset where p is
the proportion of data to be discarded at each tail. In the sensitivity analysis, estimations
have been made with trimming percentages of 0.25%, 0.50%, 0.75%, and 1%, both one-
sided and two-sided. Additionally, to demonstrate the potentially large impact of just a few
observations, estimation has been run by trimming only the single highest income, the top 5
incomes, and the top 10 incomes as well as the bottom 1, 5 and 10 incomes.
Winsorizing is a close relative to trimming. The difference is that the extreme data are not
removed from the dataset but are replaced by the value of the trimming thresholds (see, e.g.,
Atkinsonetal.,1995,Gottschalk&Smeeding,1997,Burtless,1999,Gottschalk&Smeeding,
2000). While trimming drives the inﬂuence of extreme incomes to zero by eliminating them,
winsorizing allows them to keep a high inﬂuence on the estimates, yet imposing a limit.
Winsorizing can be seen as a particular form of income imputation. If ﬁxed percentages of
the data are adjusted, the adjusted data can be expressed as
y
a
i = max(Q(0.01p),min(yi,Q(1 − 0.01p))).
Winsorizing is also referred to as ‘top-coding’ or ‘bottom-coding’ which is often applied with
respect to data conﬁdentiality issues. The impact on inequality of top-coding incomes in the
American Current Population Survey data has been much researched and has been found to
be signiﬁcant (Fichtenbaum & Shahidi, 1988, Bishop et al., 1994).
3.2 Parametric tail modelling and robustness weights
Trimming and, to a lesser extent, winsorizing are the most commonly adopted practices for
making estimates robust to outlying observations. However, Hampel et al. (1986) emphasize
that this practice can be viewed as overly conservative –especially trimming– in the sense
10Cowell & Victoria-Feser (2006) show formally that Lorenz curve ordinates (from which most inequality
measures can be derived) become robust when trimming is applied.
7of trading-off too much data information against robustness, thereby leading to a loss of ef-
ﬁciency. One more sophisticated approach to addressing robustness problems of inequality
and poverty measures is to estimate a parametric model for the income distribution tails (e.g.
the Pareto distribution function is a common choice) whose parameters are estimated using
methods robust to outlying observations. The robust, parametrically estimated tails are then
combined with the empirical distribution function for the bulk of the data to obtain a semi-
parametrically estimated distribution of incomes from which inequality and poverty indica-
tors can be estimated. This approach is detailed in Victoria-Feser & Ronchetti (1994) and
Cowell & Victoria-Feser (2007). Brazauskas (2003) or Davidson & Flachaire (2004) con-
tain illustrations of such methods. The good performance of this parametric tail modelling
strategy has recently been demonstrated by Cowell & Flachaire (2007).
As such, this approach is not based on data adjustments. Tail distribution parameters are
estimated from the available data and welfare indicators are estimated from the combined
empirical distribution function and tail parametric distributions (using, e.g., numerical inte-
gration algorithms). It is however possible to use robust parametric models for devising data
adjustment procedures. The idea is to impute extreme incomes by replacing the observed
extreme values by random draws from the robustly estimated parametric tail distributions.
Simulation uncertainty is introduced by the random draws, but this is easily controlled by
simulating a set of replicate income data, estimating poverty and inequality on each of the
replicate, just as one would do with the original micro-data, and taking as indicator the av-
erage over the replications –a practice familiar in multiple imputation procedures (Little &
Rubin, 1987)–.
The robust estimation of a parametric tail model is obviously much more technically
challenging than standard, naive adjustments, but there are expected gains to the exercise
because this approach is meant to result in a more optimal trade-off between data information
and robustness as emphasized by Hampel et al. (1986).11
In the sensitivity analysis, we have implemented this semi-parametric approach using a
Pareto distribution as the parametric tail model, as in Davidson & Flachaire (2004), Cowell &



















for y < yl. There is a long tradition of using the Pareto distribution to ﬁt the upper tail of in-
come distributions (see Kleiber & Kotz, 2003), but the practice is less common for modelling
11Note that, in practice, for EU-SILC, the technical difﬁculty can be circumvented if estimation of the tail
distribution parameters is made centrally, e.g. by Eurostat, and multiply imputed values for extreme incomes are
distributed along with the datasets. Estimation is then no more difﬁcult than from the original data. Analysts
would not be required to engage into the more difﬁcult parameter estimation stage themselves.
8the lower tail. The present exercise should be taken as illustrative for this model. Further
investigation is called for to conﬁrm the validity of this choice and to consider alternative
speciﬁcations.12
Standard maximum likelihood methods could be used to estimate the parameters of these
tail distributions. However, maximum likelihood estimates are not robust and are known to
be themselves sensitive to the presence of extreme incomes. It is therefore useful to estimate
the parameters with an algorithm that provide robust estimates of the Pareto distribution pa-
rameters.13 The procedure applied in this analysis is the so-called optimal B-robust estimator
(OBRE) detailed in Victoria-Feser & Ronchetti (1994), Victoria-Feser (2000), or Cowell &
Victoria-Feser (2007).





where µ is mean income and Q() are quantiles. This choice was selected by trial and error try-
ing to achieve a good ﬁt of the models while keeping a common rule applied to all countries.
The models ﬁtted well the upper tail of the distributions in all countries. Estimation for the
lower tail was more problematic in two countries (Portugal and Sweden). The estimated tail
models were then used to impute extreme incomes. The top and bottom 0.5% of the income
data were multiply imputed by making random draws from the estimated tail distributions.14
Eight replicate values were drawn for each extreme income.
The OBRE algorithm used to estimate the Pareto parameters robustly is an iterative algo-
rithm which involves determining iteratively robustness weights to all the data points. There-
fore, a by-product of the algorithm is a set of weights that reﬂect how much “inﬂuential” each
datum is (Hampel et al., 1986, Victoria-Feser & Ronchetti, 1994). Data with a weight of 1
are considered non-outlying according to the model, whereas deviating observations end up
with a weight between 0 and 1 that reﬂects the degree of “deviation”. These weights were
exploited to devise yet another possible approach to handle extreme incomes consisting in
keeping all income data unaffected, but multiplying the sample weights by the “inﬂuence
weights” returned by the application of the OBRE algorithm. Application of these adjusted
weights when computing poverty and inequality indicators partially offsets the effect of the
largest and smallest observations but retain them in the dataset.15
12In particular, it is conceivable to model the lower tail of the distribution with a model preventing non-
positive values, although this may not ﬁt the observed datasets which actually contain such data.
13Cowell & Flachaire (2007) note, however, that more simple, non-robust estimation of tail distribution pa-
rameters already lead to signiﬁcantly improved estimation and inference.
14This means that between 2 and 3 percent of the data are used to estimate the parameters of the distribution
tail, but only the highest/lowest 0.5 percent are actually imputed. The objective is to obtain stable tail-parameter
estimates but to adjust only the most extreme data. Cowell & Flachaire (2007) proceed similarly.
15Note that trimming can be seen as a particular case of data re-weighting where observations receive either
a weight of 1 or a weight of 0 if they fall below/above the trimming thresholds. Other re-weighting procedures
that down-weight extreme data could also be considered. See, for example, Fields & Smith (1994).
93.3 Adjustments for zero and negative incomes
Eurostat (2006c) proposes a number of simple adjustments speciﬁc to the treatment of zero
and negative incomes found in EU-SILC. To complement the analysis based on the adjust-
ments described in the previous sub-sections, three of these suggestions have also been in-
cluded in the sensitivity analysis –although one must bear in mind that they are meant to
handle negative incomes only, not extreme incomes in general.
The ﬁrst adjustment consists in removing zero and negative incomes. This is a form of
one-sided trimming where the threshold is determined by a ﬁxed value (zero), not by a given
quantile. The second adjustment is a winsorizing procedure which consists in lifting up all
negative incomes to zero. As an alternative, all zero and negative incomes were also replaced
by a value equal to 10% of median income and 25% of median income. The third adjustment
consists in imputing zero and negative incomes by randomly drawing income values from a
set of observed positive income data. We experienced with drawing positive incomes from
the lower decile group of observed incomes, and drawing from the lower quartile group. This
ensures that negative and zero incomes are replaced by low, but positive, incomes.
3.4 Dropping recipients of unreliable income sources
As a ﬁnal check, a drastic data adjustment was applied to assess the impact and the sensitiv-
ity of cross-country comparisons to the exclusion of incomes notably unreliably measured,
namely self-employment income and income from interests, dividends and proﬁts. Observa-
tionswerediscardediftheconsideredincomesourcerepresentedmorethanaquarterofeither
gross household income or disposable household income. This procedure should obviously
not be taken as a standard for estimating inequality and poverty as people relying on self-
employment incomes represent a substantial population. However as we compare inequality
or poverty for sub-populations which, it can be argued, report their income more reliably, it
provides a benchmark to assess the potential inﬂuence of unreliable income sources on coun-
try rankings in terms of welfare indicators (for a similar exercise, see Cowell et al., 1999).
4 Are cross-country comparisons of inequality and poverty
measures sensitive to extreme income adjustments?
Summary measures of inequality and poverty are numerous. Because indices may have dif-
ferent sensitivity to extreme incomes, it was decided to include a wide array of alternative
indicators in the analysis in order to provide a comprehensive record. In total, twenty-ﬁve
welfare indicators have been estimated: two central tendency indicators, fourteen inequality
measures and nine poverty indicators.
The central tendency indicators are the mean and median equivalent income. It is ex-
pected that only the mean is affected by the adjustments. Note that both can be used to
determine poverty lines and therefore their sensitivity gives indication about the sensitivity
of the determination of the poverty line.
10Theinequalityindicatorsconsideredarethefollowing: twopercentileratios(P80/P20and
P90/P10) which are robust in the sense that arbitrarily set income values can not make the
ratio arbitrarily large; two income share ratios (S80/S20 and S90/S10) which are non-robust
statistics; the coefﬁcient of variation; the standard deviation of log-incomes; the Gini coef-
ﬁcient; the relative mean deviation (also known as Schutz coefﬁcient); a set of Generalized
Entropy measures (GE(0), GE(1), GE(2)) and Atkinson inequality measures (A(0.5), A(1),
A(2)) which are known to be non-robust and potentially very sensitive to extreme incomes as
well as undeﬁned in the presence of non-positive incomes (with the exception of GE(2)). The
Gini coefﬁcient and the S80/S20 income share ratio are both in the list of “Laeken indica-
tors”, which ofﬁcially identiﬁes key indicators for monitoring social cohesion in EU Member
States. For discussion and deﬁnitions of these inequality measures, see e.g. Jenkins (1991),
Cowell (1995) or Cowell (2000).
The poverty indicators considered are: three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke with parameters 0
(a.k.a. the headcount ratio or at-risk-of-poverty rate), 1 (a.k.a. the average poverty gap ratio)
and 2 (a.k.a. the average squared poverty gap ratio); the Watts index; the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon
index; the median poverty gap ratio among the poor (a.k.a. the relative median at-risk-of-
poverty gap). The poverty line is set at 60 percent of the median equivalent income. The
headcount ratio is also estimated with a line set at 50 percent of the median. Finally FGT(0)
and FGT(1) are also estimated for households with dependent children only. The at-risk-of-
poverty rate and the relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap are both Laeken indicators. See
Zheng (1997) for a survey of these (and other) poverty measures.
All indicators were estimated for each of the fourteen countries from the single-adult
equivalent disposable household income. Data were weighted by the household size times
the household sample weight in order to depict the distribution of income among individuals.
Full results are collected in Figures 3.1 to 3.25. Each ﬁgure presents the estimates for one
particular indicator. Estimates for the 14 countries are reported as columns of points (each
country corresponding to a speciﬁc symbol). Each column of points corresponds to estimates
obtained after a particular data adjustment for extreme values. The picture in the top panel
reports the values of the estimated indicators. The bottom panel reports the relative difference
between the indicator estimated without any adjustment for extreme values and the indicator
obtained after the data adjustment (relative reductions are plotted, hence a positive value
indicates that the estimated indicator after adjustment is smaller than the estimator obtained
without any adjustment). Note that the bottom panel is empty whenever indicators can not be
estimated from the unadjusted datasets. The estimates presented in the ﬁgures are as follows:
• The ﬁrst column presents estimates obtained from the raw, full sample, that is, without
any adjustment. (These benchmark points are repeated in the last column for easier
reference.)
• The next set of columns (labelled “A Trim obs.”) helps assessing the sensitivity of
estimates to the removal of just a few extreme incomes. In the ﬁrst three columns, the
top 1, 5 and 10 observations are removed from the data. In the next three columns
the bottom 1, 5 and 10 incomes are trimmed. The last three columns show results of
trimming the 1, 5 and 10 extreme incomes at both tails.
11• The second set of columns (labelled “B Trimming %”) shows results of applying a sys-
tematic trimming of a ﬁxed percentage of the data, respectively 0.25%, 0.5%, 0.75%,
and 1%, either at the top only, the bottom only, and trimming the same percentage on
both tails.
• The third set of columns (labelled “C Winsorizing”) is equivalent to the previous results
except that the ﬁxed percentages of the data are winsorized rather than trimmed.
• The fourth set of columns (labelled “D Model-based”) presents the results based on
applying a parametric-tail model. The ﬁrst column presents estimates obtained by im-
puting the top 0.5% of the data by drawing from a Pareto distribution (with parameters
estimated from the OBRE algorithm). The second column presents estimates based on
re-weighted data with robustness weights obtained from the OBRE algorithm for the
upper tail Pareto distribution. Subsequent columns present the same results applying
the Pareto modelling to the lower tail only, and to both the lower and upper tails.
• The ﬁfth set of columns (labelled “E Adjust <= 0”) presents estimates obtained by
applying speciﬁc adjustments for zero and negative incomes, namely dropping zero
and negative incomes, lifting these incomes to either 0, a tenth of the median, or a
quarter of the median, and imputing zero and negative incomes by randomly drawing
income values from the bottom decile group or the bottom quartile group.
• The last set of columns (labelled “F Sources”) presents estimates obtained after re-
moving households relying on self-employment income, or on interests, dividends and
proﬁts, or both.
All results are reported in this paper for the record and completeness. For the sake of
brevity, only the main tendencies as well as a few observations are discussed here, however.
Focus is put on differences in the pictures provided under different data adjustments, it is not
the purpose of the exercise to make any substantive interpretation about the particular values
taken by the indicators in the different countries.
Consider ﬁrst, brieﬂy, the central tendency measures. Expectedly, the median is hardly
affected by any adjustment for extreme values. Interestingly, the median remains largely
unaffected if we drop households living on self-employment income or interest, dividends
and proﬁts. This suggests that these households are found in similar proportions on both
the upper half and the lower half of income distributions. Mean income is somewhat more
affected, especially by adjustments to the upper tail of the distribution, but not so much as to
lead to any reversals in the ranking of countries. These observations provide support to the
case of making reference to median income to set poverty lines.
Inequality indices are potentially the most problematic indicators because many of them
are known to be sensitive to extreme values and/or require adjustment for extreme low (zero
and negative) incomes for identiﬁcation. Many of the twelve indicators reported do indeed
reveal themselves sensitive to data adjustments. In most cases, it is adjustment for top in-
comes that is most inﬂuential. However, for indices that do not allow non-positive incomes
12(SD of log-incomes, Atkinson indices or most Generalized Entropy measures), adjustments
for low incomes are required and are therefore relevant too.
Quantile ratios reveal themselves as the most robust indicators of inequality. However,
this is at the cost of giving in substantive relevance because such indicators do not take into
account what happens beyond the quantile points considered. Estimates of quantile ratio are
slightly inﬂuenced by trimming at either tail of the distribution, but the effect is small and
common enough in all countries not to lead to any rank-reversals of countries. Expectedly,
imputation-type adjustments leave quantile ratios unaffected. Removal of self-employment
incomes mostly affects results for southern European countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) with
a marked inequality reduction (of up to 10 percent for P90/P10), but otherwise this impact is
limited.
Income share ratios reveal themselves much more sensitive to data adjustments. This had
to be expected because, as opposed to quantile ratios, they are non-robust statistics potentially
driven arbitrarily large or small by either very large or very small incomes. The S80/S20 indi-
cator being a Laeken indicator, it is worth paying particular attention to this measure (Figure
3.5). Adjustments in both tails have an impact. It is striking to notice that the removal of
just 10 observations at the top can lead to marked changes in the estimated indicators (often
by more than 5 percent). Trimming one percent of the data at each tail generally leads to
inequality reductions in the range of 10-15 percent. Imputation-based approaches, especially
Winsorizing or model-based imputation, have a more modest impact -generally well below
10 percent. The ordering of countries tends to be preserved by all approaches. A marked
exception is the comparison of Greece and Italy: while lower tail adjustments hardly affect
estimates for Italy, their impact on estimates for Greece is such that the ranking of the coun-
tries depend on the adjustment. More generally, cardinal differences between countries are
now markedly affected (compare also Spain and Ireland, for example). Expectedly, these
remarks hold for the S90/S10 ratio but with impacts of more important magnitudes. Adjust-
ments often lead to apparent inequality reductions well beyond 10 percent (up to 30 percent
for trimming) and reranking of countries are more numerous.
Consider now the second Laeken indicator among the inequality measures, namely the
Gini coefﬁcient (Figure 3.9). The behaviour of the Gini coefﬁcient is very similar to the
S80/S20 index, with the distinction that the Gini coefﬁcient is less affected by adjustments to
lower incomes. Upper tail adjustments are more inﬂuential, but their impact remain relatively
limited like for the S80/S20 index. Again, ordinal ranking of countries is largely preserved
(compare Spain and Ireland or Italy and Greece, however) but cardinal comparisons are af-
fected, especially by adjustments for top incomes.
The impact of data adjustments on the Gini or the S80/S20 are nothing compared to their
impact on inequality coefﬁcients such as the coefﬁcient of variation (Figure 3.7) or the GE(2)
index (Figure 3.13) which are very sensitive to the treatment of high incomes. Reductions of
estimated indices by more than 50 percent are common. The example of Norway is the most
striking: elimination of a single top income reduces the GE(2) index by almost 60 percent.
On the contrary, the relative mean deviation (Figure 3.10) turns out to be relatively stable.
Other indices are more difﬁcult to assess because they are not identiﬁed on the full sample
which contain zero or negative incomes. Only adjustments that eliminate these values can
13be considered. This, by itself, is a source of concern. Winsorizing or trimming at least
one percent of the low income data lead to the estimation of the indicators for (almost) all
countries. The model-based approach does not prevent negative incomes and, therefore, often
does not allow estimation of such measures.
Most poverty measures have been reported to be robust to data contamination when the
poverty line is exogenously deﬁned (or is itself robustly deﬁned), provided incomes are
bounded from below (Cowell & Victoria-Feser, 1996a). Given the presence of negative in-
comes in the data –therefore of no explicit lower bound for incomes–, there is interest in
checking the behaviour of the poverty indicators to the treatment of extreme incomes, in
particular low incomes.
Unsurprizingly, besides removing self-employment income recipients, only trimming has
a somewhat marked impact on the headcount ratio. The impact remains relatively low any-
way, at least for a poverty line set at 60% of the median income (in general less than 5
percent); see Figures 3.17 and 3.23.
The picture varies substantially for the other poverty measures. The magnitude of varia-
tion of the average poverty gap ratio (FGT(1)) and the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index are similar
(mostly below 20 percent); see Figures 3.18 and 3.21. Unsurprizingly, the average squared
poverty gap ratio reveals itself very sensitive to extreme incomes with variations often in
the range 20-80 percent, irrespective of the data adjustment procedure (Figure 3.19). Or-
dinal comparisons for this index are sensitive to data adjustments (see, e.g., the cases of
Greece and Belgium). The Watts index is both sensitive to data adjustment and requires that
all non-positive incomes are adjusted. Lower tail adjustments –trimming in particular, but
not exclusively– lead to marked estimated poverty reductions with these poverty measures.
Somewhat more reversals in the ranking of countries are observed than for inequality mea-
sures, in particular if trimming is applied. Winsorizing, as well as the speciﬁc adjustments
for zero and negative incomes, seem to be more inﬂuential than model-based approaches for
poverty measures. Finally, note that the median poverty gap ratio among the poor –another
Laeken indicator– is affected by trimming but is unaffected by Winsorizing or the model-
based approaches (Figure 3.22). Similar observations emerge if we consider the impact of
the various adjustments on poverty in a sub-population of interest (households with depen-
dent children).
5 Summary and discussion
The main lesson that emerges from the exercise is probably that ordinality in cross-country
comparisons is generally preserved, irrespectively of the data adjustment procedure applied.
Marked rank reversals are rarely observed because of the treatment of extreme incomes: e.g.
high/low inequality or poverty countries remain identiﬁed as such in all scenarii. Admittedly,
this is not a surprizing result, but it is certainly a reassuring baseline.
This result must be carefully qualiﬁed. Cardinal comparisons of countries are sensitive
to data adjustments made to control for extreme income data. Even if the relative ranks of
countries are rarely affected by the treatment applied to extreme incomes, the apparent mag-
14nitude of cross-country differences can vary substantially, even with relatively small data
adjustments. This will also be relevant in the time-series dimension when additional waves
of EU-SILC will become available to track the evolution over time of indicators. Care is
therefore called for, and it is recommended to check the sensitivity of one’s cardinal com-
parisons to different data adjustments before making strong statements about it. This is true
for most of both inequality and poverty indicators. Note that poverty measures are not no-
tably less sensitive to the treatment of extreme incomes than inequality measures (as soon
as one considers indices more sophisticated than the headcount ratio). It is mostly extreme
low incomes, and how they are handled, that matter for poverty indicators whereas inequality
indices are more sensitive to extreme high incomes. Theoretically sound inequality indices
such as Generalized Entropy measures and Atkinson inequality measures are particularly
problematic because they suffer from either estimation impossibility with non-positive val-
ues or from high sensitivity to extreme incomes. On the contrary, it is reassuring to note
that indices which are part of the list of Laeken indicators (Gini, S80/S20, headcount ratio,
median poverty gap ratio among the poor) are among the most stable measures.
Different data adjustment procedures can lead to different results. Adjustments that mod-
ify/impute the extreme data without removing them from the dataset lead to results that are
markedly more stable than trimming procedures. In particular, the trimming proportions can
matter a lot. On the contrary, the proportion of data winsorized, or the limit above which
a parametric model is applied tends to be less determining. Again, even if ordinal compar-
isons are generally preserved under alternative adjustment methods, cardinal comparisons
may be affected. For example, both the estimated Gini and S80/S20 inequality indicators fall
by about 5 to 20 percent if the top and bottom one percent of the income data are trimmed.
Winsorizing the same sample fractions leads to falls of about 3 to 10 percent.
Common data adjustment procedures have been applied to all countries. While country-
speciﬁc adjustments are hard to defend in such an exercise, one may argue that the amount of
data contamination may vary from country to country and that “optimal” adjustments should
be tailored for each country. Although this is arguably valid, it is hard to come up with objec-
tive arguments for this tailorization. Careful examination of the sensitivity analysis suggests
that, provided a common procedure is adopted (e.g. trimming percentages or winsorizing or
parametric modeling), adopting different parameters (such as different trim percentages) is
unlikely to lead to complete changes in the ordinality of cross-country comparisons for most
of the measures. Winsorizing has an edge over trimming in this respect as it tends to be
less sensitive to the sample percentage that is “imputed”. A similar argument can be put for-
ward for model-based imputation. In addition, parametric-tail modeling is de facto selecting
country-speciﬁc parameters (the parameters of the Pareto distributions) that lead to the best
ﬁt to the hypothesized Pareto distribution, although the fraction of the data which are imputed
has yet to be decided by the analyst.
The advantage of trimming is the ease of implementation, its effectiveness in discarding
the impact of extreme values, its long tradition, and the possible interpretation of the results
as depicting what happens to the “innner p percent” of the population, even in the absence
of data contamination. However, results show that its effectiveness is at the cost of sub-
stantially affecting the estimated indicators and being sensitive to the trimming percentage.
15This is consistent with the claim found in Hampel et al. (1986) that trimming is trading-off
too much valid data information against robustness. This may be particularly true in the
EU-SILC since the dataset can be considered as a “clean” dataset. The available EU-SILC
user database has undergone substantial pre-processing, and grossly outlying observations
have been scrutinized and possibly adjusted already (Eurostat, 2004). Winsorizing is also
straightforward and leads to more stable estimates. It suffers however from a lack of natural
interpretation; what does the adjusted sample represent if there were no contamination? The
imputation approach based on a parametric tail model seems a promising possibility. It has
theoretical advantages in terms of ‘optimal’ trade-off between robustness and conservation of
data information. Its good performance apparent here conﬁrms what has been demonstrated
recently by Cowell & Flachaire (2007) from a series of Monte Carlo studies. As far as in-
terpretation is concerned, it does not modify the underlying distribution but merely assumes
that the tails follow a parametric distribution. The observation that parametric tail adjust-
ments lead to much smaller modiﬁcations of the results may be indicative that trimming and
winsorizing are making excessive data adjustments. Again this is a plausible fact considering
the extensive prior data cleaning of the dataset.16
Self-employment income remains a source of concern: (i) it is a major source of extreme
incomes on both tails of the distribution, and (ii) it may substantially affect cross-country
comparisons(especiallywhensouthernEuropeancountriesareconcerned). Self-employment
income is traditionally difﬁcult to collect and often the least reliable among the major income
sources. Inspection indeed revealed that it may have leverage on social indicators as a source
of extreme incomes. Some important differences across countries have emerged and it can
be conjectured that the different practices in the collection of data within EU-SILC is cause
of concern. Given the manifest cross-national variability in the resulting data, it would seem
important to further harmonize practice in the future of EU-SILC.
The position taken in the analysis was not to consider negative and zero incomes as dif-
ferent from the rest of the data on a priori grounds (as in, e.g., Gottschalk & Danziger, 1985,
O’Higginsetal.,1989), butrathertreatthemasextremeincomes. Thereasonisthat, giventhe
deﬁnition of household disposable income, non-positive incomes are plausible in EU-SILC’s
main household income aggregates. Even if we agree that a household’s command of goods
and services can not be below a certain minimal amount to secure the survival of its members,
given the limitations of the income measure as an indicator of economic well-being, we can
not rule out the presence of ‘true’ small or negative amounts (‘true’ in the sense that they are
not the result of errors or mis-reporting in any of the income components collected). They
were therefore not treated differently from other extreme data. These values were adjusted
according to data adjustment procedures for the lower tail, similarly to adjustments for the
upper tail.
Needless to say, the analysis presented in this paper does not help identifying a single
all-in-one approach, nor does it help identifying the adjustment that makes the indicators the
most accurately representative of the true value of the indicator if economic well-being were
16The parametric tail approach has also been reported by Davidson & Flachaire (2004) and Cowell &
Flachaire (2007) to have virtues with respect to (resampling-based) variance estimation.
16observed directly. This would require knowledge of the true, underlying indicator, as well
as information about the degree of data contamination in the dataset. All adjustments are
simply meant to keep the magnitude of potential errors under control, balancing robustness
anddatainformation. Nosingleadjustmentguaranteestoleadtoestimatesclosertothe“true”
underlying welfare indicator. Adjustments ought to be considered in light of the resulting
stability of the estimates, and, more importantly, sensitivity checks are useful to re-assure
ourselves that conclusions are not dramatically affected by extreme incomes and they way
the are handled. Part of the analysis is also exemplary. In particular, the parametric tail
approach implemented here would deserve further testing and ﬁne-tuning, especially with
regard to the lower tail.17 Additionally, the analysis has focused on the impact of adjustments
on point estimates. A complementary analysis of the variance stabilization achieved by the
various adjustments could further help selection of a speciﬁc procedure.
One can argue that data adjustments are always hazardous in the absence of objective
information about the validity of the measured data. Subsidiary information about sources of
economic well-being (people’s accumulated physical or ﬁnancial assets in particular) would
comeinusefultoassessthereliabilityofincomedata, eveniftheyarenotthemselvesincorpo-
rated in the income concept. Perhaps more practically, over time, the longitudinal dimension
of EU-SILC will become relevant for making reliability assessment of the recorded incomes,
both by allowing the estimation of social indicators based on income ﬂows received over
longer periods, and by serving as potential checks of household’s reporting of income.
17Combined approaches could also be considered by, say, trimming negative incomes and applying a para-
metric tail model to small positive values only. It is also conceivable to adopt an asymmetric strategy with
different procedures to handle extreme high and extreme low incomes, although one must bear in mind that
both extremes can cause serious trouble.
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20Figure 1.1: Income components in Austria, Belgium and Denmark: income ranges, fraction of non-
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21Figure 1.2: Income components in Estonia, Finland and Ireland: income ranges, fraction of non-zero
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22Figure 1.3: Income components in Luxembourg and Norway: income ranges, fraction of non-zero
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Income inspection for NO
23Figure 1.4: Income components in Spain, France and Greece: income ranges, fraction of non-zero
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Income inspection for GR
24Figure 1.5: Income components in Italy, Portugal and Sweden: income ranges, fraction of non-zero
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Income inspection for SE
25Figure 2: Proportion of very low and very high incomes in disposable income and in equivalent
income. Low incomes are incomes below 10 percent of the mean (of which negative incomes are
identiﬁed in light grey), high incomes are incomes above 4 times the mean (two groups are depicted















0 .01 .02 .03 .04
Very low incomes
.96 .97 .98 .99 1
Very high incomes















0 .01 .02 .03 .04
Very low incomes
.96 .97 .98 .99 1
Very high incomes
Extreme equivalent incomes
26Figure 3.1: Central tendency measures: Estimates of mean equivalent income (in ’000 euros) in 14
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
27Figure 3.2: Central tendency measures: Estimates of median equivalent disposable income (in ’000
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
28Figure 3.3: Inequality: Estimates of the P80/P20 quantile ratio in 14 countries under alternative
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
29Figure 3.4: Inequality: Estimates of the P90/P10 quantile ratio in 14 countries under alternative
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
30Figure 3.5: Inequality: Estimates of the S80/S20 income share ratio in 14 countries under alternative
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
31Figure 3.6: Inequality: Estimates of the S90/S10 income share ratio in 14 countries under alternative
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
32Figure 3.7: Inequality: Estimates of the Coefﬁcient of Variation in 14 countries under alternative
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
33Figure 3.8: Inequality: Estimates of the standard deviation of log-incomes in 14 countries under
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
35Figure 3.10: Inequality: Estimates of the Relative Mean Deviation (Schutz coefﬁcient) in 14 countries
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
36Figure 3.11: Inequality: Estimates of the Generalized Entropy measure with parameter 0 in 14 coun-
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
37Figure 3.12: Inequality: Estimates of the Generalized Entropy measure with parameter 1 in 14 coun-
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
38Figure 3.13: Inequality: Estimates of the Generalized Entropy measure with parameter 2 in 14 coun-
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
39Figure 3.14: Inequality: Estimates of the Atkinson measure with parameter 0.5 in 14 countries under
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
40Figure 3.15: Inequality: Estimates of the Atkinson measure with parameter 1 in 14 countries under
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
41Figure 3.16: Inequality: Estimates of the Atkinson measure with parameter 2 in 14 countries under
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
42Figure 3.17: Poverty: Estimates of the headcount ratio based on a line at 60% of median income in
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
43Figure 3.18: Poverty: Estimates of the average poverty gap ratio based on a line at 60% of median
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
44Figure 3.19: Poverty: Estimates of the average squared poverty gap ratio based on a line at 60% of
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
45Figure 3.20: Poverty: Estimates of the Watts index based on a line at 60% of median income in 14





































 Bottom 0.25% imp.
 Bottom 0.50% imp.

















Lift <=0 to 0
  Lift <=0 to 0.10*med
  Lift <=0 to 0.25*med
  Impute <=0 (decile)












































 Bottom 0.25% imp.
 Bottom 0.50% imp.

















Lift <=0 to 0
  Lift <=0 to 0.10*med
  Lift <=0 to 0.25*med
  Impute <=0 (decile)









Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
46Figure 3.21: Poverty: Estimates of the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index based on a line at 60% of median
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
47Figure 3.22: Poverty: Estimates of the median poverty gap ratio among the poor based on a line at
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
48Figure 3.23: Poverty: Estimates of the headcount ratio based on a line at 50% of median income in
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
49Figure 3.24: Poverty: Estimates of the headcount ratio for households with dependent children based
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
50Figure 3.25: Poverty: Estimates of the average poverty gap ratio for households with dependent
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Bottom panel depicts indicator reduction relative to unadjusted estimate.
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